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Although increasing data have become available that link human adaptation with specific molecular changes
in nonhuman influenza viruses, the molecular changes of these viruses during a large highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus (HPAI) outbreak in poultry along with avian-to-human transmission have never been docu-
mented. By comprehensive virologic analysis of combined veterinary and human samples obtained during a
large HPAI A (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003, we mapped the acquisition of human adaptation
markers to identify the public health risk associated with an HPAI outbreak in poultry. Full-length hemag-
glutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and PB2 sequencing of A (H7N7) viruses obtained from 45 human cases
showed amino acid variations at different codons in HA (n 20), NA (n 23), and PB2 (n 23). Identification
of the avian sources of human virus infections based on 232 farm sequences demonstrated that for each gene
about 50% of the variation was already present in poultry. Polygenic accumulation and farm-to-farm spread
of known virulence and human adaptation markers in A (H7N7) virus-infected poultry occurred prior to
farm-to-human transmission. These include the independent emergence of HA A143T mutants, accumulation
of four NA mutations, and farm-to-farm spread of virus variants harboring mammalian host determinants
D701N and S714I in PB2. This implies that HPAI viruses with pandemic potential can emerge directly from
poultry. Since the public health risk of an avian influenza virus outbreak in poultry can rapidly change, we
recommend virologic monitoring for human adaptation markers among poultry as well as among humans
during the course of an outbreak in poultry.
Avian influenza viruses are typically restricted to the intes-
tinal tract of aquatic birds, in which they cause mild or sub-
clinical and unspecific symptoms. Occasionally, however, they
acquire the properties to directly infect the respiratory tracts of
terrestrial birds and mammals, including humans (49). Intro-
duction of avian influenza in humans could result in a pan-
demic when the viruses (i) possess a hemagglutinin (HA) sub-
type antigenically distinct from the currently circulating human
influenza virus subtypes, (ii) have the ability to infect and
efficiently replicate in humans, and (iii) transmit efficiently
from human to human (29, 33, 44). Infection of humans in
direct contact with wild or domestic poultry has been observed
for influenza A viruses with HA subtypes H5, H7, H9, and H10
over the past 2 decades. Low-pathogenic avian influenza
(LPAI) A (H9N2) virus caused human infections in China in
1998 and Hong Kong in 1999 and 2003 (7, 20, 35). LPAI A
(H7N2) virus infected humans in the United States in 2002 and
2003 and the United Kingdom in 2007, and LPAI A (H7N3)
virus infected humans in the United Kingdom in 2006 (10, 15,
32). Additionally, LPAI A (H10N7) virus caused human infec-
tions in Egypt in 2004 (50). Symptoms of these LPAI virus
infections were mild, and no fatalities were reported. In con-
trast, avian influenza viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 are noto-
rious for their abilities to mutate from LPAI viruses to viruses
with increased virulence for poultry. These highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) viruses typically emerge after introduc-
tion of an LPAI virus from wild birds into large commercial
poultry flocks. This was exemplified by LPAI A (H7N1) viruses
in Italy in 1999, LPAI A (H7N3) in Canada in 2004 and Chile
in 2002, and LPAI A (H7N7) in Spain in 2009 that initiated
outbreaks in poultry before mutating into the HPAI phenotype
(9, 21, 22, 40). The emergence of a lineage of HPAI A (H5N1)
virus in poultry and wild birds in Southeast Asia and its dis-
semination over a wide geographic region have been of par-
ticular concern. This virus now has evolved through drift and
reassortment into distinct lineages, with reports of transmis-
sion to500 laboratory-confirmed infected humans and a case
fatality rate of 60% (51). The widespread presence of an
influenza virus that can be transmitted to humans in regions
with limited surveillance constitutes a permanent pandemic
threat. So far, however, the prerequisite of efficient human-
to-human transmission has not been met. Similarly, the un-
precedented number of human infections during the HPAI
A (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 was cause for
concern. This outbreak struck a large number of Dutch
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poultry farms and resulted in the culling of 30 million chick-
ens. In addition, 89 virologically confirmed human cases,
including 1 death and limited human-to-human transmis-
sion, were reported (14, 18, 26).
Avian influenza viruses must undergo molecular changes to
adapt to a mammalian host (2). This is a complex process that
involves adaptation to human host cell factors to facilitate
replication and transmission (13, 30, 31, 34, 45). In addition to
emergence of the HPAI phenotype by alteration of the HA
cleavage site, LPAI virus replication in poultry can induce
polygenic molecular changes. Examples are a deletion in the
neuraminidase (NA) stalk region, which is associated with a
shift in tissue tropism in chickens (43), and receptor binding
site (RBS) mutations in HA, which affect host cell binding
affinity (13, 48). Collectively, poultry can serve as an interme-
diate host and facilitate mammalian host adaptation of avian
influenza viruses. Although increasing data that link human
adaptation with specific molecular changes in the virus have
become available, the molecular changes of influenza viruses
during a large HPAI outbreak in poultry, along with cross-
species transmission events, have never been documented.
Such information could help to improve surveillance aimed at
the timely detection of emergence of human adaptation mark-
ers to direct public health measures in the future. In this study,
the 2003 HPAI A (H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands was
used as a model (26). We combined virologic and epidemio-
logic data collected during the veterinary and medical out-
break control activities in order to identify the most likely
source of infection for each person. We then compared viruses
from humans and poultry to identify possible human adapta-
tion markers. Precursors of potential pandemic variants with
increased public health risk were detected in poultry prior to
avian-to-human transmission events.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
HPAI A (H7N7) outbreak. From individuals in contact with HPAI A (H7N7)
and suffering from conjunctivitis and/or influenza-like illness, throat, nose, and
conjunctiva swabs were collected into virus transport medium; the patients’
written consent was obtained and a questionnaire was completed. After diag-
nostic testing (26), leftovers of clinical specimens were stored in a biobank at
80°C. For all human clinical specimens, the date of sampling, the first day of
illness, demographic data, symptoms, and exposure data were stored in the
human case finding database (26). The veterinary database contained informa-
tion on type of poultry, geographical location, date of sampling, date of culling,
daily mortality data, and a unique farm identification number (6). For each farm,
the probable day of introduction of infection had been estimated previously from
daily mortality data based on a back-calculation method (6).
Sequencing of viruses in human clinical samples. All A (H7N7) influenza
virus-positive cases for which clinical samples were still available in a biobank
(n  53) were used. Prior to direct sequencing of the virus in clinical specimens, the
viral load of the specimens was determined by quantitative influenza virus re-
verse transcription-PCR targeting a 94-bp matrix gene fragment (23). Due to the
low viral load in the 53 eye swabs, a direct sequencing experiment was designed
that covered the HA receptor binding site and previously reported host range
markers PB2 A199S, E627K, D701N, and K702R (16, 18, 27). Therefore, three
PCRs targeting HA fragment amino acids (aa) 160 to 239 and PB2 fragments aa
156 to 225 and aa 585 to 720 were developed by using the PSQ assay design
package v1.0.6 (Biotage AB) for conventional Sanger sequencing. In addition,
pyrosequencing targeting of the four PB2 host range markers was performed.
Total RNA was isolated using a High Pure RNA isolation kit (Roche) followed
by reverse transcription using SuperScript III (Invitrogen) and cDNA amplifi-
cation using HotstarTaq Mastermix (Qiagen). All PCR products were Sanger
sequenced using an ABI 3730 sequencer, and PB2 host determinant markers
were pyrosequenced using the PSQ MA96 platform (Biotage AB). Contig as-
sembly and alignment were done using BioNumerics Package 6.5. Primers and
PCR protocols are available upon request.
Sequencing of human virus isolates. Due to insufficient viral load in some
clinical specimens, influenza virus culture supernatants of human A (H7N7)
viruses were used to complement the data set. Routine culture of clinical spec-
imens obtained from virologic confirmed A (H7N7) cases (n  89) using
MDCK-I cells yielded 47 A (H7N7) virus isolates corresponding to 45 human
cases (18). Forty-three A (H7N7) virus isolates were obtained from eye swabs,
three from throat swabs, and one from postmortem lung tissue from the fatal
case. As initial screening of poultry viruses using whole-genome analysis did not
reveal substantial differences when comparing nucleoprotein (NP), matrix, NS,
PA, and PB1 genes from A (H7N7) viruses sampled early and late in the
outbreak (data not shown), we focused on the more-diverse HA, NA, and PB2
genes. Hence, the full-length sequences of the HA, NA, and PB2 gene segments
of all 47 human A (H7N7) virus isolates were determined. Total RNA was
isolated using a High Pure RNA isolation kit, followed by reverse transcription
using ThermoScript (Invitrogen) and HA, NA, and PB2 gene amplification with
the LongRange kit (Kapa Biosystems). After sequencing of the amplicons, trace
files were assembled and aligned.
Data analysis. Human A (H7N7) sequences were compared with HA, NA, and
PB2 gene sequences obtained from 184 infected poultry farms that were avail-
able from a separate study (1), supplemented by sequences obtained from 47
other poultry farms infected during the outbreak (combined, sequences were
obtained from 91% of the infected farms). Each A (H7N7) farm sequence is the
consensus sequence of RNA extracted from a pool of five A (H7N7) tracheal
tissue samples of poultry. The character data from a concatenated full-length
HA, NA, and PB2 gene nucleotide alignment were used to build a maximum
parsimony network in BioNumerics using the Fitch method (17) with a greedy
tree construction algorithm, followed by random branch swapping to find the
optimal network topology. This method was chosen for its ability to link human
A (H7N7) viruses to their suspected avian source of infection by using a mini-
mum number of “evolutionary events” based on the simplest, most parsimonious
explanation of an observation and free of specific evolutionary assumptions. The
faithfulness of the entire network was determined by calculation of the global
cophenetic correlation coefficient (42). The significance of branches linking hu-
man viruses with poultry viruses was assessed by bootstrap analysis (1,000 iter-
ations) and permutation resampling (200 resampling cycles) (38). Finally, the
constructed transmission network was validated by comparing the first day of
human illness with the estimated day of introduction of A (H7N7) virus into a
poultry farm for all farm-human links.
After validation of the transmission network, potential human adaptation
markers were explored using the combined avian and human A (H7N7) se-
quence data set following categorization based on the following characteristics:
first, the observed mutations were labeled poultry induced or human induced,
depending on the host in which they were first identified. Subsequently, positively
selected sites within the human data set were detected using the single-likelihood
ancestor counting (SLAC), the random effect likelihood (REL), and the fixed
effect likelihood (FEL) methods of the Datamonkey website (36). Finally, HA
and PB2 mutations were categorized based on the location in the gene segments
and literature, while NA mutations were analyzed phenotypically for their effects
on susceptibility to the antiviral drug oseltamivir carboxylate as described pre-
viously (24, 37).
Nucleotide sequence accession numbers. GISAID accession numbers assigned
to our sequences included the following: human A (H7N7) sequence, EPI_
ISL_90869-90912; poultry A (H7N7) sequences, EPI_ISL_68268-68352 and
EPI_ISL_82373-82472 (1), supplemented by EPI_ISL_83984-84031.
RESULTS
Direct sequencing of A (H7N7) virus fragments from clini-
cal specimens. Direct sequencing of virus in the 53 influenza A
(H7N7) virus eye swabs, which had an average virus load of
3,000 genomic viral RNA copies/ml, was successful for 44
human clinical samples, yielding HA receptor binding site frag-
ments (n  43) and sequences covering previously reported
host determinant markers in PB2 at residue 199 (n  43) and
the residues 627, 701, and 702 (n  39). Sequence comparison
with influenza A/Netherlands/33/03 (H7N7) virus obtained
from the first human conjunctivitis case demonstrated the ab-
sence of PB2 host determinant markers A199S, E627K,
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D701N, and K702R but the presence of an amino acid varia-
tion in the HA receptor binding site (HA V223I [n  1] and
HA subpopulation V223A [n  1]) (Table 1).
Sequencing of A (H7N7) virus isolates. To expand the
search for human adaptation markers beyond these known
positions, influenza virus isolates were utilized to obtain se-
quences for the entire HA, NA, and PB2 genes corresponding
with 45 human cases. Compared with A/Netherlands/33/03
(H7N7) virus, amino acid variations were observed at 20 dif-
ferent HA codons, 23 NA codons, and 23 PB2 codons.
Detection of sources of human A (H7N7) virus infection. To
discriminate mutations that emerged in poultry from mutations
that were detected in viruses from humans only, the data set was
supplemented with 232 veterinary A (H7N7) HA, NA, and PB2
sequences, representing 231 poultry farms, to allow identification
of sources of human A (H7N7) virus infection. The high level of
genetic diversity observed in avian influenza A (H7N7) viruses
isolated during the 2003 HPAI outbreak in the Netherlands (1)
was used to build a maximum parsimony transmission network to
identify chains of transmission and probable sources of infection
of the sequenced human A (H7N7) cases. Since initial analysis
with 231 poultry farms did not identify clustering of human A
(H7N7) viruses with avian A (H7N7) viruses containing a deletion
in the NA stalk region (n  17), these were removed from the
data set. Removal of these sequences from the data set did not
affect the results of the study. Moreover, as a result of observed
nucleotide variations in the NA stalk region, the final transmis-
sion network was constructed with concatenated HA, NA, and
PB2 sequences from avian A (H7N7) viruses containing full-
length NA sequences, representing 214 poultry farms, to maxi-
mize the network resolution (Fig. 1). The global cophenetic cor-
relation of the transmission network was 99%, and the branches
connecting human cases (n  32) with farm sequences were
supported through a bootstrap analysis and permutation resam-
pling by 100%.
The genetic diversity observed at 214 poultry farms, repre-
sented by 149 distinct avian A (H7N7) virus sequences in the
transmission network, illustrates the emergence of multiple
avian A (H7N7) virus clusters and chains of transmission dur-
ing the outbreak. Human A (H7N7) viruses are interspersed
with avian viruses, reflecting the virus diversity in poultry, al-
lowing identification of probable sources of human A (H7N7)
virus infection. In addition to the three human secondary
cases, 22% (10/45) of the human A (H7N7) viruses were iden-
tical to their presumed avian source of infection, while 71%
(32/45) of the human A (H7N7) viruses displayed genetic vari-
ation from their avian source. Thirty of these 32 human A
(H7N7) viruses are at the tips of the network, illustrating that
the majority of human cases were dead-end A (H7N7) virus
infections. One A (H7N7)-positive culler infected both his wife
and daughter, and another culler infected his father (Fig. 1A).
Of the probable avian sources of the remaining 42 human A
(H7N7) virus infections, 35 (83%) persons had their first symp-
toms after the estimated date of introduction of virus on the
farm (back-calculated from mortality data) (5). The avian
source of infection of three different clusters of human cases
(n  7) did fit molecularly, but infection chronology was re-
versed (Fig. 1A, yellow dots). As 9% (n  24) of the infected
poultry farms were missing in our analysis, the farms of infec-
tion origin of these human clusters could be missed. Further-
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more, two human cases with unique virus sequences were
found within the transmission network (Fig. 1A, red dots).
Although these could represent human-to-avian transmissions,
the infection chronology demonstrated avian-to-human trans-
mission. A phylogenetic tree constructed with neighbor joining
and representative A (H7N7) virus isolates demonstrated iden-
tical A (H7N7) virus relations (see Fig. S1 in the supplemental
material).
Acquisition of human adaptation markers in humans. The
observed A (H7N7) virus diversity among viruses in poultry
could mask the occurrence of possible human adaptation dur-
ing infection of humans when comparing grouped human and
avian sequences. Therefore, we assessed which differences
were observed between A (H7N7) sequences from human in-
fluenza isolates with those from their most likely source, based
on the transmission network. A total of 37 amino acid substi-
tutions were identified between human A (H7N7) viruses and
their avian source of infection (HA [n  11], NA [n  14], and
PB2 [n  12]) (Table 1). Three of these mutations (HA
V223A, HA V223I, and PB2 N711K) were detected in both the
virus isolate and the corresponding human clinical specimen,
while the presence of the remaining 34 mutations could not be
confirmed by direct sequence analysis because there were no
leftover clinical specimens in our biobank, the viral load was
too low, or the site was not covered by direct sequencing.
Selection pressure analysis, using the combined avian and hu-
man sequence data set to determine whether the potential human
adaptation markers presented in Table 1 emerged under (host)
selection pressure, only recognized HA codon 223 as a positive
selection site (REL method; Bayes factor, 1.72E08). Compari-
son of human A (H7N7) virus sequences with previously identi-
fied host-specific residues (11, 28, 30) detected PB2 mutation
D567N in addition to the human adaptation marker PB2 E627K,
which was identified in the fatal human case.
During the A (H7N7) virus outbreak, the neuraminidase
inhibitor oseltamivir was used for antiviral treatment and pro-
phylaxis of A (H7N7) virus infection. Human influenza virus
isolates (n  15) with and without NA mutations compared to
their avian source of infection were screened for emergence of
oseltamivir resistance, but no resistance or reduced suscepti-
bility was observed (mean 50% inhibitory concentration [IC50],
0.46 nM; range, 0.12 to 0.70 nM). Moreover, one human A
FIG. 1. Transmission network built with concatenated full-length HA, NA, and PB2 gene segments of the A (H7N7) virus outbreak, illustrating
the position of 45 human A (H7N7) virus infections (colored) in relation to 215 A (H7N7) virus-infected farms (white) (A) and the nucleotide
differences between the A (H7N7) sequences supplemented by information on sample period and farm location (B). (A) Human A (H7N7) virus
infections in agreement with epidemiologic data are shown in green. The positions of the three secondary human cases within the network are
indicated in blue. Human infections (n 7) with onset of illness before their avian sources were estimated to be infected are indicators for missing
poultry data (yellow). Two human viruses within the transmission network could not have caused human-to-avian transmissions based on infection
dates (red). (B) After notification of the A (H7N7) outbreak on 28 February 2003, multiple poultry A (H7N7) virus clusters and chains of
transmission emerged that spread over time (colored circles) and location (colored areas). The locations of human cases refer to the locations of
their suspected avian source of infection. The nucleotide changes between specific A (H7N7) virus strains are shown on the branches. CC,
A/Netherlands/033/03, FC, A/Netherlands/219/03; P1, A/chicken/Netherlands/01/03; P2, A/chicken/Netherlands/03010132/03.
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(H7N7) isolate with NA mutations N67S, V115I, and I275T
displayed 4-fold-enhanced sensitivity against oseltamivir com-
pared with the mean (IC50, 0.12 nM).
Detection of potential human adaptation markers in poul-
try. Based on a selection of positions that are potentially rel-
evant for human adaptation of the avian virus, we detected
variations in PB2 codons 292, 567, 701, and 714 of poultry A
(H7N7) viruses that were previously identified to be host-
specific residues (11, 28, 30). Mutation I292V is not associated
with host adaptation but represents natural variation within
avian sequences (28). Mutation D567Y is not a known human
adaptation marker but is present in A/swine/Shizuoka/120/97
(H3N2) (GenBank). Mutation D701N was previously associ-
ated with efficient influenza virus replication and transmission
in mammalian species, similar to PB2 E627K (12, 19). This
mutation did emerge and subsequently spread to four poultry
farms. PB2 mutation S714I is associated with increased patho-
genicity for mammals and emerged in a chicken farm before it
spread to one of the cullers and another chicken farm (19).
We also tracked the accumulation of mutations leading up to
the fatal human infection, previously described by de Wit and
colleagues (13). Their study identified substitutions HA A143T
and PB2 E627K, attributable to increased pathogenicity in the
mouse model, in addition to four replication-enhancing NA sub-
stitutions. Mapping of markers in farm sequence data shows the
emergence and spread of these mutations during the A (H7N7)
virus outbreak in poultry (Fig. 2). HA substitution A143T
emerged during the outbreak at three different chicken farms and
spread to subsequent farms. For two of these farms, this mutation
emerged in the first week after the outbreak was identified and
authorities were notified. In addition to the virus isolated from the
fatal A (H7N7) case, a 49-year-old owner of a layer farm who
developed conjunctivitis without fever appeared to be infected
with virus variant HA A143T. He was infected by an A (H7N7)
virus identical to the virus variant HA A143T obtained from his
17,500-layer hen farm, except for one silent PB2 nucleotide sub-
stitution. The accumulation of NA mutations T442A and P458S
(73 farms) supplemented by NA A346V (30 farms) and NA
N308S (11 farms) in poultry eventually gave rise to an A (H7N7)
variant with enhanced NA activity that was transmitted to the
fatal human case (13). The PB2 E627K mutation detected in the
virus isolated from the fatal A (H7N7) case was not detected in
poultry.
DISCUSSION
In contrast to the ongoing outbreak of HPAI A (H5N1), in
which human infections have occurred as isolated cases or in a
small cluster (n 8), the HPAI A (H7N7) outbreak that struck
the Netherlands in 2003 infected at least 89 humans, including
FIG. 2. The accumulation of virulence and human adaptation markers in poultry farms (green) per gene segment, illustrating the accumulation
of NA mutations T442A and P458S (yellow), T442A, P458S plus A346V (orange) and T442A, P458S, A346V plus N308S (red) (A) and
independent emergence of HA A143T variants (yellow) and emergence of PB2 D701N (red) and PB2 S714I (blue) (B). Human viruses are
represented by open circles. CC, A/Netherlands/033/03; FC, A/Netherlands/219/03; P1, A/chicken/Netherlands/01/03; P2, A/chicken/
Netherlands/03010132/03.
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three secondary cases and one death (18, 46). The culling of
30 million birds combined with control measures did not
prevent A (H7N7) spread to a total of 255 poultry farms in the
Netherlands and 9 farms in the neighboring countries of Bel-
gium (n  8) and Germany (n  1) (8, 47). By comprehensive
virologic analysis of combined veterinary and human A
(H7N7) samples obtained during this large avian influenza
outbreak, this study provides unique knowledge on the acqui-
sition of human adaptation markers and the public health risk
associated with an HPAI virus outbreak in poultry. We dem-
onstrated the polygenic accumulation and farm-to-farm spread
of known virulence and human adaptation markers in A
(H7N7)-infected poultry farms following farm-to-human trans-
mission. These include the independent emergence of HA
mutants with increased replication kinetics, accumulation of
NA mutations facilitating efficient release of virus particles
from the host cell, and farm-to-farm spread of virus variants
harboring mammalian host determinant D701N and S714I in
PB2 (13, 44). The emergence of PB2 E627K detected in the
virus obtained from the fatal case could not be assigned to the
avian source of infection and might have emerged in the hu-
man host. Similarly, PB2 mutation D567N and HA V223I/A in
the RBS were detected in human A (H7N7) viruses only.
Sequence analysis of A (H7N7) viruses obtained from hu-
man cases was performed on all available clinical samples and
virus isolates. For 26 cases, both a clinical sample and virus
isolate were present, allowing comparison of direct sequencing
results with full-length sequences obtained from virus isolates
(Table 1). This demonstrated an absence of virus adaptation to
MDCK-I cells within the regions sequenced. Moreover, HA
RBS sequences were preserved during virus isolation using
MDCK-I cells. Since the RBS is considered to be one of the
most variable regions of the influenza virus and prone to host
cell adaptation, we reasoned that molecular variation shown in
Table 1 is the result of human adaptation. We cannot, how-
ever, fully exclude that some variation was MDCK culture
induced. Nonetheless, human adaptation markers PB2 S714I
and HA V223I/A were confirmed by direct sequencing.
Although popular phylogenetic analysis uses parametric
techniques of maximum likelihood and Bayesian Markov chain
Monte Carlo methods, such results can become inconsistent
when evolutionary rates vary. Especially when using short time
scales, e.g., during local virus outbreaks, the combination of
rapidly evolving viruses with nonevolving variants challenges
the molecular clock model, resulting in statistically inconsistent
results (25). Because maximum parsimony analysis does not
assume a specific distribution and is best suited for analyzing
sequences that are quite similar, this simple approach is the
method of choice for analyzing defined virus outbreaks, such as
the HPAI A (H7N7) virus outbreak. By addition of statistical
parameters, like the global cophenetic correlation coefficient,
bootstrap, and permutation resampling support, the potential
avian sources of human A (H7N7) virus infection could be
identified with high significance (38, 42).
Genetic variation was not associated with a diagnostic delay,
as the difference between the first day of illness and day of
consultation was, on average, 1.3 days for patients infected
with either identical viruses (n 14), infected with viruses with
synonymous mutations (n  8), or infected with viruses with
nonsynonymous mutations (n  23). Furthermore, one A
(H7N7) virus obtained from a culler was detected in his daugh-
ter (100% identical) and wife (1 synonymous substitution, 2
days later). From the wife and a culler, influenza A (H7N7)
virus isolates from eye and throat swabs were available for
sequence analysis. Sequence comparison showed no variation
between viruses obtained from eye or throat. The latter can be
explained by replication-independent spread of virus from the
eye to the throat (3, 4). The above illustrates limited A (H7N7)
virus adaptation during human infection, probably hampered
by suboptimal virus replication in the human eye combined
with oseltamivir treatment. However, the prolonged 24-day A
(H7N7) course of illness of the veterinarian that eventually
died could have facilitated virus adaptation to humans by
means of the mutation PB2 E627K. The phenotype of virus
variant PB2 E627K underlines the importance of the viral
RNA replication complex (NP, PA, PB1, and PB2) in human
adaptation of avian influenza viruses (13, 16). Available PA
sequences from the A (H7N7) outbreak revealed amino acid
variation of PA codon 666 (13). Although NP and PB1 amino
acid sequences were identical, variation (L62P) was observed
within the full-length PB1-F2 proteins. Interestingly, this
PB1-F2 variant was present in the A (H7N7) virus obtained
from the culler and it subsequently spread to both his wife and
daughter. However, experiments are needed to characterize
the effect of PB1-F2 sequence variation on viral pathogenesis.
The HPAI A (H7N7) virus outbreak was most probably
initiated by the introduction of an LPAI virus in poultry, fol-
lowing multiple weeks of silent replication and spread until it
was identified and authorities were notified at the first poultry
farm on 28 February 2003 (1, 18). The HPAI A (H7N7) virus
subsequently infected 255 poultry farms in the Netherlands
and 8 poultry farms in Belgium (47). Of interest is the long
farm-to-farm transmission distance of the A (H7N7) variant
harboring the four NA substitutions N308S, A346V, T442A,
and P458S, which spread on average 10 km (Fig. 1B). These
variants initiated an A (H7N7) outbreak in Belgium before
reemerging in a hobby farm in the southern part of the Neth-
erlands (47). A similar observation was made by Shi and col-
leagues, who associated NA mutations with rapid geographical
spread of avian influenza A (H9N2) virus in China (41). The
exceptional level of human exposure resulting from active cull-
ing and screening activities over a wide geographical region
during 2.5 months resulted in 89 human A (H7N7) cases. Our
results demonstrate that viruses obtained from human A
(H7N7) conjunctivitis cases reflect the virus diversity gener-
ated in poultry. Of greater concern, we observed the polygenic
accumulation and spread of known virulence and human ad-
aptation markers in A (H7N7) virus-infected poultry farms
following farm-to-human transmission. This implies that HPAI
viruses with pandemic potential can emerge directly from poul-
try without the need to adapt in the human host. The dynamics
of emerging virus variants in poultry with increased virulence
and enhanced transmission characteristics provide a challenge
during culling activities. Since the public health risk of an avian
influenza virus outbreak in poultry can rapidly change, we
recommend virologic monitoring of poultry in addition to hu-
mans during the course of an outbreak in poultry.
Although the emergence and spread of viruses with multiple
potential human adaptation mutations were detected in poul-
try, the impact of detecting specific mutations for public health
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risk assessment is uncertain. Nonetheless, this study suggests
that the effective control of influenza virus in poultry can pre-
vent avian influenza viruses from acquiring all their prerequi-
sites to become human tropic, in addition to the reduction of
human exposure (39). Increased awareness by veterinary and
medical authorities is needed to design more efficient surveil-
lance, diagnostic algorithms, and prepandemic planning strat-
egies.
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